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ABSTRACT
Due to the great development of secure multi-party computation,
many practical secure computation schemes have been proposed.
As an example, different secure auction mechanisms have been
widely studied, which can protect bid privacy while satisfying var-
ious economic properties. However, as far as we know, none of
them solve the secure computation problems for multiple data
providers (e.g., secure cloud resource auctions) in the malicious
security model. In this paper, we use the techniques of cut-and-
choose and garbled circuits to propose a general secure compu-
tation framework for multiple data providers against malicious
adversaries. Specifically, our framework checks input consistency
with the cut-and-choose paradigm, conducts maliciously secure
computations by running two independent garbled circuits, and
verifies the correctness of output by comparing two versions of
outputs. Theoretical analysis shows that our framework is secure
against a malicious computation party, or a subset of malicious data
providers. Taking secure cloud resource auctions as an example,
we implement our framework. Extensive experimental evaluations
show that the performance of the proposed framework is acceptable
in practice.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Privacy-preserving protocols; Secu-
rity protocols.
KEYWORDS
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1 INTRODUCTION
The notion of secure multiparty computation (SMC) allows a num-
ber of parties to compute a function over their inputs jointly, while
protects the input of each party from leaking to others. First in-
troduced by Yao [33], SMC has undergone a major development
in the recent one or two decades. Particularly, in the two-party
computation case, numerous practical secure computation schemes
have been proposed, such as [2–4, 25] etc.
With the rapid development of cloud computing technology,
cloud resource auction has attracted a lot of research attention.
Amazon EC2 provides an effective auction mechanism called Spot
Instance, which is used to allocate virtual machine (VM) instances.
There are various other cloud resource auction mechanisms that
satisfy different properties, such as truthfulness, social welfare
maximization, etc [28, 29, 36, 37]. However, the security of cloud
resource auction is rarely taken into account. Without security
guarantees, some sensitive information (e.g., bids, locations) may be
leaked from the auction; the computation process may be deviated;
and the auction output may be maliciously tampered. The security
issues of cloud resource auction can become extremely important
for companies or organizations, which may cause irreparable loss
due to the unavailability of cloud resources.
To address the above problems, Chen et al. [5] proposed a privacy-
preserving cloud resource auction protocol using techniques of
garbled circuits. The protocol guarantees that no more information
about user bids will be disclosed except what can be inferred from
the auction outcome, which means that the privacy of the auction
is well protected. In a different auction scenario, Cheng et al. [11]
proposed a privacy-preserving double auction protocol for cloud
markets based on secret sharing and garbled circuits. There is also a
line of work on secure spectrum auctions [6–8, 10]. These schemes
preserved privacy for a variety of spectrum auction scenarios, by
applying garbled circuits, secret sharing, homomorphic encryp-
tion, and others. However, current secure schemes for auctions,
especially cloud resource auctions, only provides the security in
the presence of semi-honest adversaries. Once there is a malicious
party, these schemes are not sufficient to guarantee the security of
auctions.
Motivated by the above observations, in this paper, we propose a
general secure computation framework for multiple data providers
against malicious adversaries. Our framework is originated from
secure auctions, but is also suitable for specific scenarios of se-
cure computations that meet the following conditions. First, the
encrypted input data is provided by a number of data providers.
Secondly, there are two non-colluding computation parties, who
receive the encrypted input data and perform secure computa-
tions. Finally, the encrypted computation results are returned to
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data providers without the computation parties knowing anything
about the plain results. Such kind of secure computations is also
perfectly suitable for solving the hot problem of “data island” in the
big data area, where multiple data owners want to analyze their
data jointly and securely.
Our secure computation framework is depicted in Fig. 1. To
achieve security against malicious adversaries, two independent
garbled circuits are run by two non-colluding computation parties
P1 and P2, with the roles of parties swapped. Namely, for the first
garbled circuit, P1 is the garbler and P2 is the evaluator, while for
the second P2 is the garbler and P1 is the evaluator. For each garbled
circuit, the data providers submit their inputs by committing to the
encodings (i.e., pairs of 0- and 1- garbled values) and labels (i.e., 0-
or 1- garbled values) of the inputs. They submit commitments to
multiple independent copies of encodings and labels, so that the
input consistency (that the input values for the two garbled circuits
should be the same) can be checked through the cut-and-choose par-
adigm. Furthermore, the data providers, who submit inconsistent
inputs, can be identified accurately with a cheating proof. In this
way, for each garbled circuit computation, the garbler gets input
encodings, and the evaluator gets input labels, without using obliv-
ious transfers. The two independent garbled circuits are run simply
using the standard techniques of garbled circuits, with exception
that P1 and P2 do not decode the two garbled outputs. Instead, all
the output encodings and labels are committed and published to
all data providers, and the encodings and labels corresponding to
its output are opened to each data provider. The data providers
then decode the two versions of garbled outputs, and verify if both
outputs are equal. The output verification results remain private
from both P1 and P2, and can be proved to other data providers by
revealing the correct openings from both P1 and P2.
The computation 
party P1
The computation 
party P2
Commitment
Commit
Data providers
 Garbled circuits computation twice
Swap the roles of GC
Figure 1: Secure computation framework for multiple data
providers against malicious adversaries.
The design of our secure computation framework for multiple
data providers against malicious adversaries includes the following
challenges. First of all, to achieve malicious security, it is necessary
to run two independent garbled circuits, which leads to the problem
of input consistency. It is challenging to guarantee the consistency
of inputs to the two garbled circuits, while leaking no information
about the inputs to both P1 and P2. Secondly, the logic of a garbled
circuit may be tampered by the party who generates the circuit,
how to prevent such attacks requires elaborate designs. Last but
not least, in the presence of a malicious computation party or a
set of malicious data providers, how to verify the outputs is still
unknown. To address the above challenges, we should carefully
design the input, computation, and output phases of the frame-
work jointly, so that the entire protocol achieves security against
malicious adversaries.
Our main contributions can be summarized as follows.
• We propose a general secure computation framework for
multiple data providers in the presence of malicious adver-
saries. In our context, this framework achieves malicious
security by only running two independent garbled circuits,
and eliminates the use of an oblivious transfer in garbled
circuit computations.
• We design an input consistency check mechanism to ensure
that all data providers submit the same input values for the
computation of two independent garbled circuits. Further-
more, this mechanism can identify which data providers are
cheating exactly by providing a cheating proof.
• We apply our framework to implement a secure cloud re-
source auction mechanism against malicious adversaries,
and do extensive experiments to evaluate its performance.
Experiments show that the performance of our framework
is acceptable in practice.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
reviews related work briefly. Section 3 introduces some technical
preliminaries. We present the detailed design and security analysis
of our framework in Section 4. In Section 5, we apply our framework
to implement a secure cloud resource auction, and evaluate the
performance in term of computation and communication overheads.
In the end, we summarize the paper in Section 6.
2 RELATEDWORK
2.1 Secure Multiparty Computation
There is a large amount of literature on secure multiparty computa-
tion. However, since in this paper we mainly use the techniques of
garbled circuits and cut-and-choose, we review only related work
concerning these two techniques.
There are numerous fundamental studies on garbled circuits.
The“point-and-permute” method [1] makes computing a garbled
gate need only to decode one ciphertext, which greatly improves
the computation efficiency. The technique of “Free-XOR” [20] en-
ables that the computation of garbled XOR gate only needs to
XOR the corresponding input labels directly, which improves both
computation and communication efficiency. In [19], the authors
described some effective Boolean circuit for garbled circuit construc-
tion. These studies mainly focus on improving the performance of
garbled circuits in the semi-honest setting, and they are compatible
with our work.
Cut-and-choose is usually used as a generic technique for en-
abling security against malicious adversaries. In [14], the authors
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showed how to obtain secure two-party computation in the pres-
ence of malicious adversaries by the cut-and-choose paradigm.
Later, Huang et al. [16] proposed a secure two-party computation
protocol using a symmetric cut-and-choose to improve efficiency.
This line of work also includes [17, 18, 21, 23, 24], and these studies
have improved on the original cut-and-choose scheme in different
methods. There are still schemes secure against malicious adver-
saries without using cut-and-choose. For example, Wang et al. [30]
proposed an effective constant-round protocol framework for ma-
liciously secure two-party computation, by constructing a single
authenticated garbled circuit. Cut-and-choose garbled circuits are
still the mainstream methods for achieving security against ma-
licious adversaries due to efficiency. Different from these studies,
our work focus on secure computation in a specific context such
as auctions. By using the context, we are able to achieve security
against adversaries with only two independent runs of garbled
circuits, and thus greatly improve the efficiency.
There are also a few secure computation schemes that consider
specific contexts and achieve security against malicious adversaries.
The closest work is literature [2], in which the authors proposed
a secure and efficient outsourcing scheme for sequence compar-
isons against malicious adversaries, also with two independent
garbled circuit runs. Indeed, we get some inspirations from this
work. However, this work considered only a single data provider
and assumed implicitly that the data provider is honest. This is
a strong assumption, and reduces its applicability. Instead, our
work considers multiple data providers who may be maliciously
corrupted. The schemes [3, 4] securely outsource cut-and-choose
garbled circuit computation to a cloud provider in the presence of
malicious adversaries, greatly reducing the overhead of mobile de-
vices who conduct the computations. Their computation models are
quite different from ours in that there is only a mobile user involved
in the secure computation. Paper [25] proposed a secure function
evaluation system that allows the reuse of encrypted values gen-
erated in a garbled circuit computation. This work is compatible
with our work, and can be applied in our framework in the future.
2.2 Secure Cloud Resource Auction
In the past few years, a large number of truthful auction mecha-
nisms for cloud resource allocation have been proposed. Wang et
al. [29] proposed an effective truthful auction mechanism, which
used a greedy allocation and a critical value payment to enable
fair competition for cloud resources. In [35], the authors proposed
two allocation mechanisms based on combinatorial auction, CA-
LP and CA-GREEDY, to allocate cloud virtual machine resources.
The mechanisms based on combinatorial auction can significantly
improve the efficiency of allocation and generate higher benefits
to cloud providers. Papers [26, 34, 36, 38] have presented effective
mechanisms for dynamic virtual machine resource allocation. Un-
fortunately, none of these studies considered the issue of security.
Recently, a few studies on secure cloud resource auction have
been proposed. Chen et al. [5] proposed a privacy-preserving cloud
resource auction protocol, and used garbled circuits to protect the
bid privacy in the process of the auction. Cheng et al. [11] proposed
PDAM, a privacy-preserving double auction mechanism for cloud
markets based on secret sharing and garbled circuits. Xu et al. [32]
designed a privacy-preserving double auction mechanism based
on homomorphic encryption and sorting networks. A related re-
search topic that we need to mention is secure spectrum auction.
Literature [6–8, 10] proposed a number of secure spectrum auction
mechanisms for a variety of auction scenarios, by applying garbled
circuits, secret sharing, homomorphic encryption, and other tech-
niques. These secure auction mechanisms considered only security
in the presence of semi-honest adversaries. Instead, our secure com-
putation framework achieves security against malicious adversaries
in this context for the first time.
There is also a line of work on auctions with differential privacy,
such as [9, 31, 39]. However, differential privacy aims to protect
privacy from analyzing published output by adding noise to the
original output, which is quite different from secure multiparty
computation fundamentally.
3 TECHNICAL PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we introduce some technical preliminaries for our
framework.
3.1 Garbled Circuits
Garbled circuits are a cryptographic tool for secure multiparty com-
putation [22, 33]. During the process of garbled circuit computation,
two parties hold their own private inputs respectively. Specifically,
one holds its private input x1, and the other holds its private input
x2. They want to compute a function f over their inputs securely,
without revealing any information about one party’s private input
to the other, except what can be inferred from the output. Then
one party (called the garbler) prepares a garbled circuit to evaluate
f (x1,x2). The garbler transmits the garbled circuit, garbled input
x1, and the output decoding table to the other party (called the
evaluator). The evaluator obtains its garbled input x2 obliviously
by oblivious transfer, then computes the garbled output with both
parties’s garbled inputs, and then decodes the plain output (i.e.,
f (x1,x2)) by the output decoding table.
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Figure 2: Illustration of a garbled OR gate
A garbled circuit can be constructed as follows. First, the garbler
converts the computed function f to a Boolean circuit containing
only, without loss of generality, binary gates. Then, the garbler
associates two random labels K0w and K1w to each wire w of the
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circuit, encoding bit 0 and bit 1, respectively, and for each binary
gate д of the circuit with input wireswi andw j , and output wire
wk , computes ciphertexts
Enc(Kbiwi ,K
bj
wj )
(Kд(bi ,bj )wk )
for bi ,bj ∈ {0, 1}. A garbled gate is composed of above four ci-
phertexts. Fig. 2 illustrates a garbled OR gate. Here, Enc denotes the
symmetric encryption algorithm used for garbled circuits. Finally,
all the garbled binary gates constitute the garbled circuit of function
f .
Given input labelsKbiwi ,K
bj
w j , the evaluator can compute a garbled
gate by recovering its corresponding output label Kд(bi ,bj )wk . Then,
a garbled circuit which consists of a number of garbled gates can
be computed by gate by gate.
In the process of a standard garbled circuit computation, the
evaluator needs to run a 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer protocol
with the garbler [27] to get its input labels. In this paper, the data
providers generate their input encodings and labels, and send input
encodings to the garbler and input labels to the evaluator, thus
eliminating the use of oblivious transfers.
3.2 Cut-and-choose
The technique of cut-and-choose based on garbled circuits [24]
is used to construct a secure two-party computation protocol in
the presence of malicious adversaries. It works as follows. The
garbler prepares multiple copies of garbled circuits and sends the
commitments of these circuits to the evaluator. Then, the evaluator
selects randomly a set of circuits (called check circuits) and asks the
garbler to open the commitments of them. After the garbler opens
these commitments, the evaluator checks whether these circuits
are correctly constructed. If all the check circuits are correct, the
evaluator evaluates the circuits whose commitments have not been
opened (called evaluation circuits), and takes most of the results of
evaluation circuits as the final output. Otherwise, the evaluator will
terminate the protocol. The method of cut-and-choose forces the
garbler to construct a garbled circuit exactly. If a malicious garbler
constructs the circuit by mistake, the evaluator will detect it with a
high probability.
In our paper, we use the idea of cut-and-choose to design an
input consistency check. This check ensures that data providers
submit the same input for the two independent garbled circuits,
with a proof indicating the data providers who is cheating.
3.3 Problem Statement
In our secure computation framework illustrated by Fig. 1, there
are n data providers (n ≥ 1), and each data provider u holds its
private input xu ∈ {0, 1}l , for u ∈ [1..n]. All the data providers
want to compute a function over their inputs f (x1,x2, · · · ,xn ) =
{yu }u ∈[1..n], whereyu ∈ {0, 1}l
′ is data provideru’s corresponding
output, and l ′ is the bit length of each output. The data providers
submit their inputs to two non-colluding computation parties P1
and P2, which cooperate to compute the function f securely, and
send each data provider its output.
The security goal is that all data providers want to compute the
function f correctly, and obtain their respective output without
Table 1: Notation for our framework
Notation Descriptions
f The function computed.
xu, yu Input and output of the data provider u .
n The number of data providers.
s The number of pairs of comment sets.
l, l ′ Bit length of each input and output.
ρ The challenge string for cut-and-choose.
Wu,i, j
First set of j-th pair of commitment sets on u ’s i-th
input wire.
W ′u,i, j
Second set of j-th pair of commitment sets on u ’s i-th
input wire.
Kk,bu,i, j
Label assigned to b in j-th pair of commitment sets on
u ’s i-th input wire for k-th garbled circuit.
Kk,bu,i
Final label assigned to b on u ’s i-th input wire for k -th
garbled circuit.
K
k,b
u,i
Label assigned to b on u ’s i-th output wire for k-th
garbled circuit.
Hk,bu,i
Final hash value assigned to b on u ’s i-th input wire
for k-th garbled circuit.
Ek The output encodings of k-th garbled circuit.
Ok The output labels of k-th garbled circuit.
Ek,u The output encodings of u of k-th garbled circuit.
Ok,u The output labels of u of k-th garbled circuit.
leaking anything about any data provider’s input to others (in-
cluding other data providers, P1 and P2). The threat model is that
either P1 or P2, or a subset of data providers (in extreme case all
the data providers) may be corrupted maliciously. We aim to design
a protocol that securely computes the function f in this security
model.
4 OUR FRAMEWORK
In this section, we present our secure computation framework for
multiple data providers, and analyze its security in the presence of
malicious adversaries. Table 1 describes the notation we use in our
protocol.
4.1 Design Rationale
In our framework, the data providers submit their inputs in proper
form to two non-colluding computation parties P1 and P2, who run
two independent garbled circuits of the same computation, with
the roles of P1 and P2 swapped. The security against malicious
adversaries is achieved by considering together the three phases,
namely input consistency check, garbled circuit computation, and
output verification.
Input consistency check. The input consistency check uses the cut-
and-choose paradigm. It ensures that each data provider provides
labels representing the same values for the two independent garbled
circuit computations. To prepare its input submission, each data
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provider u first generates s independent copies of encodings and
labels corresponding to u’s input bits, where each copy contains
encodings and labels for two independent garbled circuits. Here,
by an encoding we mean a pair of 0- and 1- labels. Note also that
the way of input eliminates the uses of oblivious transfer, and
thus can improve the running efficiency. Next, each data provider
u commits to each copy of encodings and labels, and sends the
commitments to both P1 and P2. Then, both parties randomly open
some of the s commitments of copies (i.e., check sets) to check if
the commitments are well constructed, and each party partially
opens the remaining commitments (i.e., evaluation sets) to get its
corresponding encodings and labels, which are XORed together for
two garbled circuits computations, and both parties check if these
encodings and labels are consistent cooperatively. Through the
consistency checks for both check and evaluation sets, our design
ensures that the data provider u can only cheat when it provides
consistent labels in all check sets, and inconsistent labels in all
evaluation sets, resulting in a failure probability 2−s+1.
Garbled circuit computation. In this phase, two independent gar-
bled circuits are computed without inputs and outputs learnt by
the two computation parties. The first one is generated by P1 and
evaluated by P2, while the second is generated by P2 and evaluated
by P1. In the computation, an evaluator only learns input labels,
while a garbler learns only input encodings. Both parties learn
nothing about the plain inputs as long as they do not collude with
each other. Similarly, when the output labels are obtained, an eval-
uator only learns output labels, while a garbler learns only output
encodings. The two parties learn nothing about the plain output.
Additionally, the standard garbled circuit techniques already offer
protection against a malicious evaluator. Therefore, the run of two
independent garbled circuits, with both parties learning neither
inputs nor outputs, enables the malicious security, since in this case
generating and evaluating an incorrect circuit poses no security
risks on the data providers.
Output verification. All the output labels and encodings are com-
mitted and published by both parties for verification. The commit-
ments to labels and encodings corresponding to the output of each
data provider u are then opened to u, who decodes the labels with
encodings to get two versions of plain outputs. Each data provider
u checks if the two versions of outputs are equal. If the check fails,
u provides a proof by revealing the openings for its output commit-
ments. If there is no failure proof, each data provider u accepts the
output. Note that both computation parties do not know the result
of output verification, and an attack by generating and evaluating
an incorrect circuit cannot succeed.
4.2 Design Details
Protocol 1 describes the overall framework. Specifically, our proto-
col is divided into three phases: input consistency check, garbled
circuit computation and output verification. The details of each
phase are described as follows.
4.2.1 Phase 1: Input Consistency Check. To keep the consis-
tency of the inputs, we design a mechanism which combines a
commitment scheme and the idea of cut-and-choose at this phase.
The data providers submit the labels of their inputs twice, then
Protocol 1 Secure computation framework for multiple data
providers against malicious adversaries
Input: Each data provider u hold its input xu .
Output: P1 and P2 get⊥, and each data provideru getsyu if output
verification succeeds, ⊥ otherwise.
Phase 1: Input Consistency Check
Each data provider u:
1: Computes s pairs of commitment sets
{
Wu,i, j ,W
′
u,i, j
}s
j=1
by
Eqs. (1) and (2), for the i-th input wire.
2: Computes a position set {com(bu,i, j )}sj=1, bu,i, j ∈ {0, 1}, in
term of xu .
3: Sends all above commitments to parties P1 and P2.
Parties P1 and P2:
For each input wire i of each u, do Lines 4 to 6.
4: Do commitment construction check: randomly open and check
some pairs of commitment sets.
5: Do label consistency check: check the consistency of final labels
in evaluation sets, and give a consistency proof.
6: Evaluate the final labels by Eq. (8) for the two garbled circuits,
respectively.
Phase 2: Garbled circuit computation
7: P1 generates garbled circuit GC1, P2 generates GC2, and they
send their respective circuits to each other.
8: P1 evaluatesGC2 to get output labelsO2 while P2 holds output
encodings E2, and P2 evaluates GC1 to get O1, while P1 holds
E1.
Phase 3: Output verification
9: P1 and P2 commit to output encodings and labels by Eq. (9) and
(10), and publish all commitments.
10: The commitments, {com(Ek,u ), com(Ok,u )}2k=1, related to each
data provider u’s output is opened to u.
11: Each data provider u computes two versions of outputs from
{Ek,u ,Ok,u }2k=1, and accepts the output if both versions of
outputs are equal for all u.
the computation parties P1 and P2 verify the consistency of two
submissions. This phase consists of the following three steps.
Step 1: Input commitment.
Suppose the bit length of all inputs is l . Each data provider u
generates s pairs of commitment sets for each of its input wires.
Specifically, for the i-th (i ∈ {1, l}) bit of its input, data provider
u generates s pairs of commitment sets
{
Wu,i, j ,W
′
u,i, j
}s
j=1
, and
Wu,i, j ,W ′u,i, j are defined as follows.
Wu,i, j = {com(K1,0u,i, j ∥K1,1u,i, j ∥K2,bu,i, j ),
com(K2,0u,i, j ∥K2,1u,i, j ∥K1,bu,i, j )}
(1)
W ′u,i, j = {com(K1,0u,i, j ∥K1,1u,i, j ∥K2,1−bu,i, j ),
com(K2,0u,i, j ∥K2,1u,i, j ∥K1,1−bu,i, j )}
(2)
Where com refers to a perfectly binding commitment scheme [12],
and symbol ∥ denotes connection of strings, andb ∈ {0, 1} is chosen
randomly and independently for each u, i , j.
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The commitment setWu,i, j (resp.W ′u,i, j ) contains two commit-
ments corresponding to the case that data provider u’s i-th input
wire is assigned to bit value b (resp. 1 − b). In the first commitment,
(K1,0u,i, j , K
1,1
u,i, j ) represents the j-th encoding of u’s i-th input wire
in the first garbled circuit, and K2,bu,i, j (resp. K
2,1−b
u,i, j ) represents the
j-th label of u’s i-th input wire in the second garbled circuit. Simi-
larly, in the second commitment, (K2,0u,i, j , K
2,1
u,i, j ) represents the j-th
encoding of u’s i-th input wire in the second garbled circuit, and
K1,bu,i, j (resp. K
1,1−b
u,i, j ) represents the j-th label of u’s i-th input wire
in the first garbled circuit. The two commitments will be opened
to parties P1 and P2, respectively, enabling them to compute two
independent garbled circuits with party roles exchanged. The two
commitments guarantee that the j-th labels of u’s i-th input wire
sent to both parties are consistent (i.e., representing the same bit
value, either b or 1 − b), and the randomness of b ensures that the
bit value is not leaked even when bothWu,i, j andW ′u,i, j are opened
for check, or either of them is opened for evaluation.
Moreover, each data provider u commits to a position indicat-
ing which commitment set in each pair it chooses as input com-
mitment set according to its input bit. These input commitment
sets will be opened for evaluation later. The commitments to posi-
tions constitute a position set, denoted by {com(bu,i, j )}sj=1, where
bu,i, j ∈ {0, 1}, and the j-th input commitment set of u’s i-th in-
put wire is indicated to be Wu,i, j if bu,i, j = 0, and W ′u,i, j oth-
erwise. For example, if the position set of u’s first input wire is
{com(0), com(1), · · · , com(0)}, it means that the corresponding in-
put commitment sets areWu,1,1,W ′u,1,2, . . . ,Wu,1,s , respectively.
Fig. 3 illustrates above constructions.
𝑊𝑢,1,1 = 𝑐𝑜𝑚 𝐾𝑢,1,1
1,0 ∥ 𝐾𝑢,1,1
1,1 ∥ 𝐾𝑢,1,1
2,0 , 𝑐𝑜𝑚 𝐾𝑢,1,1
2,0 ∥ 𝐾𝑢,1,1
2,1 ∥ 𝐾𝑢,1,1
1,0
𝑊𝑢,1,1
′ = 𝑐𝑜𝑚 𝐾𝑢,1,1
1,0 ∥ 𝐾𝑢,1,1
1,1 ∥ 𝐾𝑢,1,1
2,1 , 𝑐𝑜𝑚 𝐾𝑢,1,1
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Figure 3: The commitment sets corresponding to the first in-
put wire of the data provider u
Each data provider u sends all the commitment sets constructed
above on each of its input wires to both computation parties P1 and
P2. If the input length is l , there are ls pairs of commitment sets
and a total of ls × (4 + 1) = O(ls) commitments to send.
Step 2: Consistency check.
In this step, we first check if the input commitments are properly
constructed by opening and checking some of the commitments,
and then check if the remaining commitments satisfy label consis-
tency for garbled circuit evaluation.
Commitment construction check. To determine which pair of com-
mitment sets are used for opening and checking, a challenge string
is prepared using a coin-tossing protocol as follows for each input
wire i of each data provider u: 1) Party P1 selects a random string
ρ1 ∈ {0, 1}s ; 2) Party P2 selects a random string ρ2 ∈ {0, 1}s ; 3)
Both parties exchange random strings, and compute the final chal-
lenge string by ρ = ρ1 ⊕ ρ2 . If the j-th bit of ρ is 1, the pair of
commitment sets {Wu,i, j ,W ′u,i, j } will be opened and checked, and
we call opened pairs of commitment sets check sets. Similarly, if the
j-th bit of ρ is 0, the pair of commitment sets {Wu,i, j ,W ′u,i, j } will
be used to evaluate the garbled input bit, and we call these pairs
evaluation sets.
Each data provider u opens the commitments in all check sets
of each input wire i to both P1 and P2 for checking. It also opens
the commitments, corresponding to evaluation sets, in the position
set of each input wire i to both parties. For any input wire i , any
j-th pair of commitment sets that is check set, both parties check if
the two commitments inWu,i, j (resp.W ′u,i, j ) are well constructed.
Specifically, suppose that the two commitments ofWu,i, j orW ′u,i, j
are opened as two triples (K1,1,K1,2,K1,3) and (K2,1,K2,2,K2,3),
respectively. Parties P1 and P2 check if the combination of the first
two values in each triple, namely, (K1,1,K1,2) and (K2,1,K2,2), form
encodings (i.e., K1,1 , K1,2 and K2,1 , K2,2), and if the the third
value of one triple is the label representing the same bit value of the
encoding of the other triple (i.e., K1,1 = K2,3 and K2,1 = K1,3, or
K1,2 = K2,3 and K2,2 = K1,3). If any of the checks fails, both parties
output “Bad Input” and abort the protocol.
Fig. 4 demonstrates the opening and checking process of u’s first
input wire. First, the challenge string generated determines which
pairs of commitment sets are check sets (in green solid circles) and
which are evaluation sets (without green solid circles). Second, all
commitment sets in check sets are opened, and in the position set,
all commitments responding to evaluation sets are opened such that
the input commitment sets (in red hollow circles) are determined.
Finally, both P1 and P2 check if all the opened check sets are well
constructed.
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Figure 4: An example of the commitment construction check for
data provider u ’s first input wire. The challenge string is ρ =
⟨1010 · · · 0⟩. The values of b ’s are 0, 1, 1, 0, · · · , 0, and the position
indicators committed are also 0, 1, 1, 0, · · · , 0, which implies the bit
value of the input wire is 0.
Label consistency check. The commitment construction check
does not suffice for input consistency check. It is possible that the
the commitment sets in the evaluation sets are not well constructed,
or that a data provider does not commit to a correct position set.
Thus, we design a label consistency check for labels committed by
the input commitment sets.
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Suppose the index set of evaluation sets for data provider u’s in-
put wire i is J ⊂ [1..s]. Denote the input commitment set byW ∗u,i, j
, and the corresponding triples committed by {(K1,1j ,K1,2j ,K1,3j ),
(K2,1j ,K2,2j ,K2,3j )}, for j ∈ J . Let H (.) be a collision-resistant hash
function. To start evaluating, the first commitments of {W ∗u,i, j }j ∈J
are opened to party P1, and the second ones are opened to party P2.
As a result, party P1 gets triples (K1,1j ,K1,2j ,K1,3j )j ∈J , and P2 gets
triples (K2,1j ,K2,2j ,K2,3j )j ∈J , respectively. Both P1 and P2 check the
consistency of these triples as follows.
1) For q ∈ {1, 2, 3}, P1 computes
H1,q = ⊕j ∈JH (K1,qj ) (3)
C1,q = com(∥j ∈JH (K1,qj )) (4)
2) For q ∈ {1, 2, 3}, P2 computes
H2,q = ⊕j ∈JH (K2,qj ) (5)
C2,q = com(∥j ∈JH (K2,qj )) (6)
3) P1 randomly reorders tuple (H1,1,H1,2) to get a new tu-
ple (H˜1,1, H˜1,2) and the corresponding commitment tuple
(C˜1,1, C˜1,2), which are sent to P2.
4) P2 randomly reorders tuple (H2,1,H2,2) to get a new tu-
ple (H˜2,1, H˜2,2) and the corresponding commitment tuple
(C˜2,1, C˜2,2), which are sent to P1.
5) P1 checks ifH1,3 ∈ {H˜2,1, H˜2,2}. If the check fails, P1 outputs
a message “Bad Input”, and a proof consisting of the data
provider u, the input wire i , triples (H˜2,1, H˜2,2,H1,3) and
(C˜2,1, C˜2,2,C1,3), and then abort the protocol.
6) Similarly, P2 checks if H2,3 ∈ {H˜1,1, H˜1,2}. If the check fails,
P2 acts in the sameway except outputting a proof with triples
(H˜1,1, H˜1,2,H2,3) and (C˜1,1, C˜1,2,C2,3).
If the above label consistency check fails, all the data providers
are aware of which input wire of which data provider does not
satisfy the consistency. They can also verify this result by examining
the corresponding proof. Suppose a data provider u0 received a
proof indicating u’s input wire i fails to satisfy consistency, with
triples (H˜1,1, H˜1,2,H2,3) and (C˜1,1, C˜1,2,C2,3). The result can be
verified as follows.
1) u0 requests P1 to open commitments C˜1,1, C˜1,2, and obtains
{H (K˜1,1j ),H (K˜1,2j )}j ∈J ; requests P2 to open commitment
C2,3, and gets {H (K2,3j )}j ∈J .
2) u0 checks if the following three equations hold at the same
time. 
H˜1,1 = ⊕j ∈J H (K˜1,1j )
H˜1,2 = ⊕j ∈J H (K˜1,2j )
H2,3 = ⊕j ∈J H (K2,3j )
(7)
If the check fails, u0 concludes that the parties are cheating.
3) u0 checks if H (K2,3j ) = H (K˜1,1j ) for all j ∈ J , or H (K2,3j ) =
H (K˜1,2j ) for all j ∈ J . If this check fails, the label inconsis-
tency verified.
Fig. 5 illustrates how to check label consistency for data provider
u’s first input wire in the example of Fig. 4. All the opened labels in
the same position of input commitment sets of the wire input are
hashed and XORed to get the final hash values,H1,0u,1,H
1,1
u,1,H
2,0
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by P1, and H2,0u,1, H
2,1
u,1, H
1,0
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1,1
u,1), sends the latter to P2, who checks
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reorders pair (H2,0u,1, H
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2,1
u,1), sends the latter to
P1, who checks if H2,0u,1 is contained in {H˜2,0u,1, H˜2,1u,1}. If both checks
succeed, then the label consistency check succeeds.
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Figure 5: The label consistency check for data provider u’s
first input wire.
Step 3: Label evaluation.
Once the consistency check succeeds, parties P1 and P2 proceed
to compute the final labels for each input wire of each data provider.
Just use the same denotation as that of label consistency check.
We take as an example data provider u’s input wire i , whose index
set of evaluation sets is J ⊂ [1..s]. The input commitment set
W ∗u,i, j commits to triples {(K1,1j ,K1,2j ,K1,3j ), (K2,1j ,K2,2j ,K2,3j )}, for
all j ∈ J . Then, party Pk , for k ∈ {1, 2}, computes its the final
labels as follows.
Kk,q = ⊕j ∈JKk,qj (8)
for q ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Finally, concerning data provider u’s input wire i ,
party P1 uses (K1,1,K1,2) as the encoding for the first garbled circuit,
and usesK1,3 as the label for the second garbled circuit; while party
P2 uses (K2,1,K2,2) as the encoding for the second garbled circuit,
and uses K2,3 as the label for the first garbled circuit.
Fig. 6 shows how to compute the final labels for data provider
u’s first input wire in the example of Fig. 4. All the opened labels in
the same position of the input wire’s input commitment sets are
XORed to get final labels. In the end, P1 holds (K1,0u,1, K
1,1
u,1) as the
encoding for the first garbled circuit, and K2,0u,1 as the label for the
second garbled circuit. Symmetrically, P2 holds (K2,0u,1,K
2,1
u,1) as the
encoding for the second garbled circuit, and K1,0u,1 as the label for
the first garbled circuit.
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Figure 6: Computation of final labels for data provider u’s
first input wire.
4.2.2 Phase 2: Garbled Circuit Computation. In this phase,
the protocol performs two independent garbled circuit computa-
tions to prevent a malicious garbler that attacks by generating a
falsified garbled circuit. The protocol proceeds as follows.
1) P1 uses {K1,0u,i ,K1,1u,i }u ∈[1..n],i ∈[1..l ] as the encodings of all
data providers’ input bits to generate the first garbled circuit
GC1, where n is the number of data providers, and l is the
bit length of inputs. Denote the output encodings of GC1 by
E1 = {K1,0u,i ,K1,1u,i }u ∈[1..n],i ∈[1..l ′]
where l ′ is the bit length of outputs. P1 sends GC1 to P2,
while holds E1 by itself.
2) P2 uses {K2,0u,i ,K2,1u,i }u ∈[1..n],i ∈[1..l ] as the encodings of all
input bits to generate the second garbled circuitGC2. Denote
the output encodings of GC2 by
E2 = {K2,0u,i ,K2,1u,i }u ∈[1..n],i ∈[1..l ′]
P2 sends GC2 to P1, while holds E2 by itself.
3) After receiving GC2, P1 uses {K2,xu,iu,i }u ∈[1..n],i ∈[1..l ] as in-
put labels to compute GC2, obtaining the output labels
O2 = {K2,yu,iu,i }u ∈[1..n],i ∈[1..l ′]
4) After receiving GC1, P2 uses {K1,xu,iu,i }u ∈[1..n],i ∈[1..l ] as in-
put labels to compute GC1, obtaining the output labels
O1 = {K2,yu,iu,i }u ∈[1..n],i ∈[1..l ′]
At the end of this phase, P1 holds (E1,O2), and P2 holds (E2,O1),
respectively.
4.2.3 Phase 3: Output Verification. In this phase, both parties
P1 and P2 commit to all the labels and encodings corresponding to
the outputs of the two garbled circuits. Then, they open to each
data provider u the commitments to the labels and encodings cor-
responding to its output. Each data provider u can verify if the
outputs of the two garbled circuits are consistent, and all the data
providers determine cooperatively whether to adapt the computed
result. The protocol proceeds as follows.
1) P1 computes the commitments to the output encodings of
the first garbled circuit and the output labels of the second
garbled circuit.
com(E1) ={com(E1,u )}u ∈[1..n]
={com(∥l ′i=1(K
1,0
u,i ∥K1,1u,i ))}u ∈[1..n]
com(O2) ={com(O2,u )}u ∈[1..n]
={com(∥l ′i=1K
2,yu,i
u,i )}u ∈[1..n]
(9)
2) Symmetrically, P2 computes the commitments to the output
encodings of the second garbled circuit and the output labels
of the first garbled circuit.
com(E2) ={com(E2,u )}u ∈[1..n]
={com(∥l ′i=1(K
2,0
u,i ∥K2,1u,i ))}u ∈[1..n]
com(O1) ={com(O1,u )}u ∈[1..n]
={com(∥l ′i=1K
1,yu,i
u,i )}u ∈[1..n]
(10)
3) Both P1 and P2 publish all the commitments to all data
providers.
4) P1 opens com(E1,u ), com(O2,u ), and P2 opens com(E2,u ), com(O1,u ),
to each data provider u.
5) Each data provider u decodes O1,u with E1,u to get y(1)u ,
decodes O2,u with E2,u to get y(2)u , and checks if y
(1)
u = y
(2)
u .
If the check fails, u proves this by publishing the openings
in 4), namely O1,u , E1,u , O2,u , E2,u and their corresponding
random parameters, to other data providers.
6) If there is no fail proof, each data provider u accepts its
output yu ; otherwise, u discards its output.
Note that in this phase, the data providers decode their outputs
by themselves, without P1 and P2 learning anything about the plain
outputs.
4.3 Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the security of our framework against
malicious adversaries. As we know, a malicious adversary may use
any efficient attack strategies and may deviate from the protocol
specification arbitrarily. The formal definition of security against
malicious attackers refers to [13].
In our paper, amalicious adversary refer to the situations that one
of parties P1 and P2 may be malicious, or a subset of data providers
may be malicious. For instance, party P1 or P2 may tamper with the
logic of the garbled circuits when it acts as a garbler, or the data
providers may submit inconsistent inputs to both parties.
Theorem 1. If either P1 or P2 is maliciously corrupted, or a subset
of data providers are maliciously corrupted, our framework is secure
against malicious adversaries.
We only sketch the proof. Since the roles of P1 and P2 are exactly
symmetric, we analyze the security in two cases as follows.
Malicious P1: In this case, all data providers and P2 are honest
and follow the protocol. We analyze the security by distinguishing
the three phases.
In the input consistency check phase, all commitments are cor-
rectly constructed, and the adversary can only see all commitments,
input encodings of the first garbled circuit GC1 and input labels of
the second garbled circuit GC2. The adversary can learn nothing
about the inputs. If it wants to deviate the protocol, all it can do
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is to falsify a check failure and abort the protocol. However, any
check failure can be verified publicly by honest data providers and
P2, so the cheating of P1 would be caught.
In the garbled circuit computation phase, since the standard gar-
bled circuit techniques, used in our work, are secure against ma-
licious evaluators, we need only to analyze the security when P1
runsGC1 as a garbler. Because in the computation ofGC1, P1 learns
nothing about the inputs and outputs, the only attack is to gener-
ate an incorrect garbled circuit. However, this attack informs the
adversary nothing about the inputs, since the outputs cannot be
observed, and would be caught by the data providers in the output
verification.
In the output verification phase, the adversary only sees output
encodings of GC1 and output labels of GC2, and learns nothing
about the inputs and outputs. The adversary can attack by modify-
ing the output labels, which would be caught by the data providers
in the output verification.
The above analysis shows that the security holds in this case.
The security of the case in which P2 is malicious can be analyzed
similarly.
Malicious data providers. In this case, both P1 and P2 are hon-
est, and a subset of data providers (including the case of all data
providers) are corrupted. We analyze the security by distinguishing
both input consistency check and output verification phases, since
data providers are not involved in the garbled circuit computation
phase.
In the input consistency check, we begin by proving the lemma
below.
Lemma 1. If one input wire of a data provider u has inconsistent
labels for the two garbled circuits, the protocol aborts with probability
of at least 1 − 2−s+1.
Proof. The commitment construction check ensures that the
labels in check sets must be all consistent. Otherwise, the check
will fail. The label consistency check ensures that the labels in the
input commitment sets of evaluation sets must be all consistent
or all inconsistent (cf. Fig. 5). Otherwise, the check will also fail.
Thus, the only successful cheating is the case that the labels in
check sets are all consistent, and the labels in input commitment
sets are all inconsistent, which happens with the probability 2−s .
Furthermore, since there must be at least an evaluation set, and
the case of ρ = ⟨00 · · · 0⟩ should be eliminated, the probability of
cheating becomes 2−s+1.
The proof is completed. □
If s becomes large, the probability of cheating can be sufficiently
small. The security against the malicious data providers can be
adaptively achieved in term of s value. Furthermore, any dishonest
data provider will be identified exactly by a proof.
In the output verification phase, both P1 and P2 commit to all the
output encodings and labels of the two garbled circuits correctly,
and open the commitments to each data provider honestly. The ma-
licious data providers cannot change the output of the computation,
since all the encodings and labels are correctly committed, and the
output can be publicly verified if necessary.
From the discussion of the above two cases, we conclude that
our protocol is secure against malicious adversaries.
5 APPLICATION AND EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we implement our secure computation framework
instantiated with a cloud resource auction mechanism, and con-
duct extensive experiments to evaluate the performance in term of
computation and communication overheads.
5.1 Cloud Resource Auction
5.1.1 Auction Mechanism. We consider a truthful cloud resource
auction mechanism from paper [29]. In such an auction, a cloud
provider providesm types of virtual machine (VM) instances (with
various configurations in CPU, memory, storage, etc. ). Each type
i has ki VM instances, and its weight is denoted by ωi , which is
used to distinguish between different VM types. There are n bidders
requesting VM instances. Each bidder j (1 ≤ j ≤ n) requests kij VM
instances of type i , and the corresponding per-instance bid is bij .
The auction proceeds as follows.
(1) The cloud provider computes the average price per weighted
instance of each bidder j :
b j =
∑m
i=1 k
i
jb
i
j√∑m
i=1 k
i
jωi
, for j ∈ [1..n]
and ranks the bidders in descending order of b j .
(2) After sorting, VM instances are allocated to the bidders by
a greedy algorithm. If the VM instances requested by the bidder j
meet the following conditions:
∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,m} ,
∑j−1
t=1 k
i
txt + k
i
j ≤ ki ,
the request is satisfied, and x j = 1. Otherwise, x j = 0.
(3) The cloud provider applies the following pricing rules to get
a critical payment:
• A bidder whose request is denied pays 0;
• A bidder having no critical bidder pays 0;
• A bidder who receives VM instances requested pays the
critical value.
where the critical bidder jc of a bidder j is the first bidder following
j that has failed but would win without j, and the critical value v jc
of j is the minimum value j should bid in order to win. It can be
shown that
v
j
c = b jc
√∑m
i=1 k
i
jωi
Thus, the cloud provider charges each winning bidder j (x j = 1)
the amount v jc .
5.1.2 Data-oblivious Auction Algorithm. To secure the cloud re-
source auction by the technique of garbled circuits, the auction
mechanism must be first converted into a data-oblivious algorithm,
whose execution path does not depend on the input values. An
example of data-oblivious algorithm is illustrated in Fig. 7. The data-
oblivious algorithm can then be easily converted into a Boolean
circuit. Instead of designing the data-oblivious algorithm ourself, we
simply adopt one in paper [5]. The details of the specific algorithm
refer to Algorithm 2 in [5].
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int getMax(int x, int y){
int max;
if (x >= y) {
max = x;
} else {
max = y;
}
return max;
}
Program A
int getMax(int x, int y){
int max;
int flag = (x >= y);
max = x * flag + 
y * (1 - flag);
return max;
}
Program B
Figure 7: An illustration of data-oblivious algorithms. Both algo-
rithms find the maximum value of two numbers x and y . The exe-
cution path ofProgramA depends on the input values x andy , while
that of Program B is the same regardless of the input values x and
y .
5.2 Experimental Settings
We instantiate our frameworkwith the cloud resource auctionmech-
anism in Section 5.1. In the implementation, two non-colluding
servers, which provide cryptographical services, are first deter-
mined to play the roles of computation parties P1 and P2. In prac-
tice, these two non-colluding servers may be from two security
companies with well-deserved reputations, respectively. Then, the
bidders play the roles of data providers, who submit their bids as
inputs to P1 and P2, and receive their respective outputs from the
two parties. Particularly, we let the cloud provider also play the
role of a data provider, with the exception that the cloud provider
submits no input, while receives all outputs.
We implement our framework on FastGC [15], which is a Java-
based framework for garbled circuit computation. We use SHA-256
hash function for computing hash values or doing commitment. In
our simulation experiments, the number of virtual machine (VM)
types is setm = 6 by default, and the number of instances for each
VM type is set to a parameterk . The number of pairs of commitment
sets for each input wire is set to s = 10, and all values in the
auction are represented by 16 bits. Each bidder j (1 ≤ j ≤ n) requests
a random number of VM instances ranging in [0, 3] with a per-
instance bid ranging in [0, 100] for each VM type. We simulate our
protocol on a 64-bit Windows 10 Desktop with Intel(R) Core(TM)
i5 CPU @3.40GHz and 16GB of memory. In our experiments, we
focus on the following performance metrics:
• Running time: The total time spent by P1, P2 and the bidders
during the execution of an auction.
• Communication overhead: The total volume of messages sent
by P1, P2, and the bidders during the execution of an auction.
5.3 Experimental Results
We evaluate the performance of the protocol by varying the number
of VM typesm, the number of bidders n, and the instance count
per VM type k .
We first setm = 6, and evaluate the performance by varying n
and k values. Fig. 8 shows the experimental results as k increases
from 50 to 300, for n = 100, 150 and 200, respectively. we can
observe that in each case the total running time and communi-
cation overhead nearly remain the same, no matter how k varies.
Conversely, if k is fixed, and n increases, the running time and com-
munication overhead will increase accordingly. This indicates that
the performance of the protocol is hardly affected by the instance
count per VM type k , but is significantly affected by number of
bidders n.
Second, we set n = 150, and evaluate the performance by varying
m and k values. Fig. 9 traces experimental results as k increases
from 50 to 250, for m = 6, 12, and 18, respectively. We can see
that the running time and communication overhead change little
as k increases when both m and n values are fixed. Conversely,
when k is fixed, and m increases from 6 to 18, the running time
and communication overhead will increase approximately linearly.
This shows that the performance of the protocol is hardly affected
by the instance count per VM type k , but is significantly affected
by number of VM typesm.
Third, we setm = 6, and evaluate the performance by varying
n and k values. In Fig. 10, we set k = 75 and 150 respectively, and
track the experimental results as n increases from 50 to 300. We
can observe that, when k is fixed, in other words, the resources are
limited, the running time and communication overhead increase
super-linearly as n increases. When fixing n, the differences in
running time and communication overhead is small for k = 75 and
k = 150. We can observe the same as that from Fig. 8.
Finally, we set k = 100, and evaluate the performance by varying
n andm values. Fig. 11 illustrates the comparison of the running
time and communication overhead as n increases when adopting
differentm values. We fix k to 100 and setm to 6, 12 and 18, respec-
tively. We can observe that the running time and communication
overhead increase super-linearly as n increases from 50 to 250.
Moreover, when fixing n value, the running time and communi-
cation overhead will increase significantly as m increases. This
demonstrates that the performance of the protocol is significantly
affected by both the instance count per VM type k and number of
VM typesm.
From these experimental analysis above, we can conclude that
the performance is affected approximately linearly by m, super-
linearly by n, and hardly by k . Furthermore, when the number of
bidders n takes values of several hundreds, the running time is
tens of minutes, and the communication overhead is thousands of
MB, on our PC platform. This is acceptable in practice for some
small-scale applications at least.
6 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have presented a general secure computation
framework for multiple data providers. Making use of the specific
context, our framework is able to achieve security against malicious
adversaries by running only two independent garbled circuits, with
the roles of computation parties swapped. To defend against mali-
cious data providers, we have designed an input consistency check
mechanism using the cut-and-choose paradigm. This mechanism
enables that all data providers submit the same inputs for the two
garbled circuits, and is able to identify accurately the data providers
who cheat by submitting inconsistent inputs with a cheating proof.
We have also designed an output verification mechanism, such that
the correctness of outputs can be verified publicly by all the data
providers, without both computation parties knowing anything
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Figure 8: Performance comparison as the instance count per
VM type k varies for three different values of the number of
bidders n.
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Figure 9: Performance comparison as the instance count per
VM type k varies for three different values of the number of
VM typesm.
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Figure 10: Performance comparison as the number of bid-
ders n varies for two different values of the instance count
per VM type k .
about the output. We theoretically prove the security of the entire
framework. Furthermore, we have implemented our framework
in a cloud resource auction scenario, and extensive experimental
results show that the performance of our framework is acceptable
in practical applications.
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